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Abstract : A collection of 417 energy scenarios was assembled and harmonized to compare 
what they said about nuclear, fossil and renewable energy thirty years from their publication. 
Based on data analysis, we divide the recent history of the energy forecasting in three periods. 
The first is defined by a decline in nuclear optimism, approximately until 1990. The second by a 
stability of forecasts, approximately until 2005. The third by a rise in the forecasted share of 
renewable energy sources. We also find that forecasts tend to cohere, that is they have a low 
dispersion within periods compared to the change across periods.
1. Introduction
Energy forecasts have been influencing energy and climate policies for over thirty years. For [3]  
“forecasts are the mirrors of our ignorance not the embodiments of our understanding”, and “are 
not  worth  even  the  cost  of  the  cheapest  acid-free  paper  on  which  they  get  printed”.  This 
castigates the whole scenario-making exercise as –at best– an art of communication rather than  
a science. While energy scenarios indeed are not predictions, and while there are systematic 
biases  which sometimes lie  with the  modeler  as  much as  in the  process,  and while quality 
should always be improved, we argue that forecasts are much more than lobbying accessories.
Various strands of scientific reflexive literature look at the methods, functions and assumptions 
of energy forecasts. For example [1,6] describe useful guidelines for current practitioners based 
on  methodologically  sound  practices.  Others  like  [2,5]  analyze  the  sources  of  errors  with 
comparisons between global energy scenarios and thirty years of actual historical experience.
In contrast to these strands of literature, we adopt a non-prescriptive, non-judgmental approach 
to look at the history of energy forecasting from 1977 to 2014. The next section describes the 
method and data: we assembled a collection of 417 energy scenarios, harmonized the results, 
and limited ourselves to interpreting the exploratory data analysis. Section 3 demonstrates how 
this time span of almost forty years can be organized in three periods. Section 4 concludes this 
short note.
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2. Method and data
The sample counts 122 energy studies. These studies span a publication period running from 
1977 to 2014. Their scopes vary from global to national. Some are annual series such as the  
IEA's  World  Energy  Outlook  and  the  EIA's  Annual  Energy  Outlook,  others  are  sporadic 
forecasts.  Since  a  single  study  usually  contains  multiple  scenarios,  the  dataset  counts  417 
different scenarios. The dataset expands [7], which was based on a collection of 88 studies and 
322 scenarios.
The  collection  is  a  comprehensive  rather  than  a  random sample.  We sought  to  include  all 
influential  forecasts  available.  This  implies  a  bias  towards  more  recent  forecasts.  Energy 
forecasting exercises became more common over time, recent studies are both more accessible  
and  they  provide  more  forecasts  each  than  earlier  studies.  The  number  of  observations  is  
roughly the same before and after 2005. We omitted from the sample three studies from 1971,  
1973 and 1975. Those forecast nuclear at respectively 50%, 50% and 25% of the energy mix, so 
adding they back would only support our results.
Energy  forecasting  studies  all  differ  in  regional  scope,  regional  division,  forecast  horizon, 
energy  units  accounting,  currency  units  accounting,  scenario  building  methodology,  and 
background hypotheses. It is necessary to harmonize their results in order to compare them on a  
common  ground.  We  did  so  in  five  steps,  using  straightforward  if  time-consuming 
transformations.  First,  we  organized  energy  mix  forecasts  using  only  three  primary  energy 
source categories: fossil, nuclear and renewable. Second, all forecasts were converted into ton  
oil equivalent (toe), the common unit employed in energy economics. Third, the results of each 
study were recast  into a  common constant  forecast  horizon set  to 30 years,  interpolating if  
necessary. Fourth, relative shares for each category were computed for every scenario in each 
study. Fifth and finally, the median shares were computed among all  the scenarios for each  
study. Reference [7] describes the method more thoroughly.
3. Results
Figure 1 presents the history of the 30-years forecasts of primary energy shares for nuclear, 
fossil and renewable energy. For nuclear energy, technological optimism steeply declined from 
the end 1970’s to the mid 1980’s. Then the forecasted t + 30 share of nuclear energy stabilizes 
around a share of about five percent. A slowly rising trend is perceptible since the end 1990’s.
For the forecasted  t + 30 share of renewable energy, Figure 1 shows first a plateau from the 
1980’s onwards at about 10%, with a drop from the mid-1990’s to mid-2000’s and a very sharp 
rise after 2005. We quantified these trends using linear regression over 1977-2001 and 2002-
2014, see Figure 2. Linear regressions show a flat trend between 1977 and 2001, followed by 
significant  positive  increase  since  2002.  The  place  of  renewable  in  the  forecasted  primary 
energy mix has drastically changed since the 2000’s, going from about 7% to more than 20%.
The picture regarding forecasts of fossil fuel primary energy is somewhat different. A plateau is 
discernible from the 1970’s to the mid 1980’s, followed by a regular rise of its share peaking in  
the mid 1990’s, and decrease after that. We quantified these trends by linear regression over 
1977-2000 and 2000-2014 (figure not shown). The moving average smoothers for both period 
and the linear regressions show opposite trends in forecasts. For the period 1977-2000, the share 
of forecasted fossil primary energy rises from about 70% to about 90%, mainly because of the  
fall in nuclear optimism. In the 2000-2014 period, the graph shows a drop from about 90% to 
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70% in the forecasted fossil primary energy share, practically a return to the initial forecasted  
share. In the forecasts, the decrease of the fossil energy share is mostly balanced by an increase  
in renewable energy share since we saw that the increase in nuclear energy share is small.
Combining the changes for forecasted shares of nuclear and of renewable primary energy, our 
data suggest that the history of recent energy forecasting can be divided into three periods. To 
adopt round numbers as the breaking points, the periods are 1977-1990, 1991-2005, 2006-2014.
We examined the extend to which the median scenario remained unchanged within each time 
period. To this end we used a common statistic:  the coefficient of variation, also called the  
relative standard dispersion, defined as the ratio of the  standard deviation over the mean of a 
sample.  Table 1 indicates the coefficient of variation of the median forecasted shares per year  
for the whole period and the three periods identified above.
The “Fossils” column shows that  coefficients of  variation are low and do not  change:  0.05  
within each period. The meaning is that the median forecasts for the share of fossils fuels do not 
change much within a period. The overall coefficient is also low.
The “Nuclear” column shows that forecasts about nuclear energy have a high coefficient of  
variation, 0.62, in the first period. This is as expected, since the period is defined as years in  
which where nuclear optimism decreases. The coefficient drops to 0.25 in the second period, 
then 0.10 in the third. This shows that since 1990, studies hold a more stable view about nuclear.
The “Renewable” column tells a different story. The third period being defined as the one where 
the forecasted share of renewable energy increase, the variability around the trend also increase  
in that period, at 0.32. But this effect is less marked than for nuclear. The median forecast is not 
very stable in any period, compared to the other two primary energy sources.
Figure 3 shows more detailed data. For simplicity, we plot only three time span of five year, and 
we omit  the “share of renewable” dimension.  This confirms that the 1977 - 1981 time span 
belongs to a period of rapid forecasts change regarding nuclear. It also confirms that in the later  
two five year time span, studies published within a period lie close to each other, compared to  
the difference across periods.
4. Summary and concluding remarks
In summary, we have shown that in energy forecasts, technological optimism about renewable  
energy replaced technological  optimism about nuclear energy. The history of forecast  about 
shares of primary energy for the 37 years studied can be organized in three periods.
A first  period is  characterized by a severe decline in nuclear technological  optimism which 
coincides with a rise in the forecasted share of fossil fuels, with the share of renewable energy 
relatively low. The Chernobyl catastrophe in 1986, appears near the end of the period. It did not 
cause this decline which was already ongoing before it occurred.
This is followed by about fifteen years of stable forecasts, the 1990-2005 period.
A third period, since the mid-2000's, shows a modest rise in nuclear energy and a very steep rise  
in  forecasted  share  of  renewable  energy.  This  third  period  clearly  signals  a  new  form  of  
technological  optimism  obviously  driven  by  the  climate  change  challenges.  As  the  Kyoto 
Protocol was signed in 1997, it appears that it took more than five years to convince energy  
forecasters that the system would really change.
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This periodization is possible because our historical analysis of 122 studies suggests that energy 
forecasts exhibit collective behavior. Within a 5 year period, forecasts tend to stay close to each 
other. Deviations between studies are small in front of the deviations across periods. Modelers’  
representations of the future tend to follow a common world view, this is not just an art  of 
communication.  There is  tendency to cohere around what  are obvious manifestations of the 
given “zeitgeist” of the time.
Is  collective  behavior  in  energy  forecasting  a  good  or  a  bad  finding  for  the  discipline? 
Convergent  results  from  independent  sources  strengthen  scientific  results,  but  coordinated 
anticipations about long-term events can be driven more by speculation than by rationality. With 
regard to that, we believe that the two forecasts changes we detected were not mostly subjective,  
but that they reflect objective changes in the underlying social system.
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6. Figures and table with captions
Table 1: The variability of consensus. Higher coefficients means more variable median forecasts 
over time. For example: the coefficients of variation of the median of scenarios, for nuclear 
energy, for scenarios published between 1977 and 1990, is 0.62. This means that the standard 
deviation of the median forecast is large in front of the mean. Indeed, as can be seen on Figure 
1, in the period the median forecast decreased from over 25% to less than 5% of the energy mix.
Period of scenario publication Nuclear Fossils Renewable
All years, 1977-2014 0,69 0,08 0,43
1977-1990 0,62 0,05 0,29
1991-2005 0,25 0,05 0,23
2006-2014 0,10 0,05 0,32
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Figure 1: Evolution of the T+30 forecasts of the share of nuclear, fossil and renewable energy
Figure 2: The change in forecasts on the share of renewable energy at T+30 in mid-2000s.
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Figure 3: Energy forecasting studies : change in the late 70s, then coherence within periods.
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